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Energy-related impacts and conflicts have been used to account for the emergence, mainte-
nance, and collapse of complex societies. On the other hand in the last years, sustainability
science has incorporated different frames of reference in order to facilitate the vision of
sustainable futures. Most of them suggest that the search for satisfiers of human needs
should be rooted on the local (a) construction of organic articulations of people with nature
and technology and (b) generation of growing levels of social, economic, and energy self-
reliance.This new regional kind of social agreement implies a redefinition of cultural norms
and institutions, which at the same time leads toward increased levels of sovereignty
for the social group engaged in this process. Sovereignty must not only be understood
here in its political sense (as traditionally found in the literature) but also in its technolog-
ical and energy acceptations. In this paper, we address this last constituent in terms of
energy security levels and hierarchy in energy infrastructures between Spain and Catalonia,
the latter being a Spanish autonomous community known for its sovereignty aspirations.
We show a remarkable difference in energy security levels between both regions, which
clearly hinders Catalonia’s capacity to currently achieve a higher level of self-reliance in
energetic terms. We suggest that this result is a consequence of the imperfect hierarchy
that characterizes energy infrastructures at the spatial scale, and that it can be generalized
to all regions where infrastructural systems have been historically assessed and developed
under a nationwide planning scheme.
Keywords: energy security, critical infrastructures, legal framework, sovereignty, MOSES, social collapse, energy
flows, robustness
INTRODUCTION
Energy is currently driving the global economy at all scales and
nourishes the developmental capabilities of every nation and soci-
ety: it is needed to power all kinds of machinery, to supply the
industrial system with commodities, for the food production sys-
tem, and to foster and sustain information and communication
technologies (Bardi, 2013). At the same time, our energy system
is absolutely dependent on fossil fuels, a fact that clearly jeopar-
dizes our subsistence for, at least, three different reasons (MacKay,
2009): (a) fossil fuels are a limited resource, their availability will
be reduced in the short-term due to an increased cost of extraction
and they will probably run out in the mid-term; (b) our depen-
dence on one energy source endangers our security of energy
supply; and (c) global warming due to increasing carbon diox-
ide concentrations in the atmosphere from fossil-fuel burning is
becoming the major threat to biodiversity and mankind as a result
of climate change. How energy sources, flows, and transformation
efficiencies affect the daily life of a social group, and its conse-
quences in the technological and socioeconomic spheres in the
near term is thus a fundamental issue in order to devise more
sustainable futures.
In order to facilitate the vision of sustainable futures, sustain-
ability science has been incorporating complementary frames of
reference which, in one way or another, involve the definition of
an overall human quality of life as a function of both the level of
human needs met and the extent to which individuals or groups
are satisfied with this level (Max-Neef et al., 1991; Costanza et al.,
2008). Whereas human needs are constant, few, finite, and clas-
sifiable, the way these needs are satisfied change over time and
between cultures according to the energy resource (and its ther-
modynamic limit) used by each civilization. Satisfiers and inputs
required to fill each need must come from a social contract, involv-
ing different types of capitals (i.e., time, built, natural, social,
or human) and based on (a) the generation of growing levels
of self-reliance (constrained to available local energy resources)
and (b) the construction of organic articulations of people with
technology and nature.
Considering this new paradigm that sustainability science sug-
gests, and given the fundamental role of energy in the definition
of a living system, it seems energy and energy-related concepts
could be used as a guiding principle for community-based social
prospective activities. Here we use the term “prospective activity”
as a proxy for any social enterprise involving political, cultural, or
economic development of a group or region. If this prospective
activity aims at a new (or transitional) definition of society under
a human-scale developmental process, the social enterprise must
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involve a new definition of the system, and not a mere reproduc-
tion of what has been previously done. From the energy point of
view, it means the achievement of a low carbon economy, based
on renewable energies, and to regain control over energy use and
exploitation, at an individual and community levels, through more
energy efficient and demand side management activities, to name
just a few (Odum and Odum, 2001). In post-industrial societies,
current energy systems are the outcome of far-reaching, in time
and space, historical processes, which involve many economic, cul-
tural, and political decisions. Energy conversion and distribution
infrastructures are basically the crystallized consequence of eco-
nomic and political agreements, driven by economies of scale and
constrained by the limitations of materials, energy, money, and
information (Bettencourt et al., 2007). But in contrast with natural
energy hierarchy, which accounts for fractal-like structures with
spatial organization and material concentrations, and the increase
of storage concentration with scale (Margalef, 1993; Odum, 2007),
hierarchy in manmade energy systems is clearly broken at a specific
level: infrastructures are obviously not fractal, storage levels can-
not be indefinitely subdivided and, at a certain spatial scale, energy
resources cannot be equally distributed. Thus, growing levels of
self-reliance cannot be solely based on defining new political and
social contracts but also on assessing how energy transmission and
distribution infrastructures will finally fit into those new defined
articulations.
In this paper, we use the IEA model of Short-term Energy Secu-
rity (MOSES) (Jewell, 2011) to discuss and assess the plausibility
of an energy sovereignty processes for the case study of Catalo-
nia. We argue that attaining the maximum and sustainable energy
self-reliance should be the focus goal of any new social contract
that looks for a sustainable future. Current sovereignty-looking
regions (i.e., Quebec, Scotland, Basque Country, Catalonia, etc.)
should not base their discourse only in political decisions but
firmly focused on how the inner dynamics of the social system
will be strongly shaped by energy requirements and constraints.
We end up highlighting some of the steps needed to develop a
strong and durable energy policy framework in order to increase
resilience and decrease risks at a regional level.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The IEA MOSES can be used to analyze security of supply of seven
primary energy sources (crude oil, natural gas, coal, bioenergy and
waste, hydropower, geothermal energy, and nuclear power) and
two groups of secondary fuels (oil products and biofuels) (Jew-
ell, 2011). It considers four dimensions of energy security, which
include external factors, related to imported energy, and domes-
tic factors, related to use, conversion, and distribution of energy
within national borders. External and domestic factors analyzed
within the MOSES frame of reference reflect both risk exposure
and resilience, defined here as the ability of energy systems to with-
stand disruptions. MOSES analyses the four dimensions of energy
security using 35 indicators, chosen to signal the level of risk or
adequacy of resilience for different energy sources and fuels in
national energy systems. Each indicator relates to at least one of
the four dimensions of energy security. Indicators are aggregated
in two steps: (1) three bands of values (based on the observed
ranges of the indicator values in IEA countries) corresponding to
low, medium, and high vulnerability are established for each indi-
cator; (2) this categorization is used to establish an energy security
profile that takes into account how particular risks may exacerbate
one another and how particular resilience capacities may mitigate
specific risks. National energy systems can then be grouped in five
energy security profiles, for each energy source or fuel, based on
their overall risk exposure and resilience capacities. The energy
security profiles are marked by letters (i.e., from A to E), mov-
ing from lower risk/higher resilience profiles (with highest energy
security level labeled with A) to higher risk/lower resilience profiles
(with lowest energy security level labeled with E). In this paper, we
follow MOSES methodology to evaluate short-term energy secu-
rity for two different regions: Spain and the autonomous region
of Catalonia. Although analysis of power generation, electricity,
and end-uses is still under development in MOSES, we have also
included a very preliminary analysis of the electricity transmission
infrastructure based on complex networks analysis (Solé et al.,
2008).
At a national level, the Spanish energy system is currently char-
acterized by a huge dependency on external and non-renewable
energy sources (Danesin et al., 2012). In 2011, Spain imported
84.3% of its primary energy, well above the European average,
worsening in 2012 by the largest coal imports, while only 15.7%
of it was nationwide produced (Figure 1). The recent evolution
of its commercial trade balance for oil and oil products and fuels
reaches 40,000 MC, 4% of its GDP, which is a severe burden for
the current economic situation of the country (CORES, 2013).
With an important amount of power generation derived from
coal, net electricity exports decreasing and those of gasoline being
practically constant, the Spanish energy system has reduced its
energy efficiency in the last 2 years. Energy-related emissions of
CO2 increased 2% in 2011, mainly due to the increase on the share
of coal and the lower contribution of hydropower to the elec-
tricity mix. Although high level of diversification providers of oil
and natural gas mitigates much of the risk of this dependence in
regard to security of supply, the energy sector, and therefore also
the Spanish economy, remain exposed to significant price risk of
these fuels.
As far as renewable energy is concerned, concentrated solar
power and wind energy have substantially increased their share
in energy generation during the last 5 years. Concentrated solar
power almost doubled its capacity, which implies 70% of that
installed worldwide. Wind represents roughly 20% of total power
installed in Spain. It is equivalent to 9% of total wind power
installed worldwide and 15.5% of average share in the Spanish
electricity mix in 2011 (EDP Renovables, 2012). The use of biofuels
has increased 18% compared to 2010, following the projected path
of integration into biodiesel consumption. As a whole, renewables
reached 10.4% of primary energy conversion in Spain in 2011.
In terms of sectoral analysis and end-uses, transportation sector
uses by far the most energy (25.6%) and it accumulates the largest
amount of CO2 emissions (28%). In the case of Spain thus, this
sector remains a priority in the design of sustainable policies. In
terms of generated external value, Spain energy sector was reduced
by two-thirds when external costs due to contamination by CO2,
SO2, NOx, etc., are discounted. Transport again is the sector, which
generates the greatest amount of external costs, while electricity
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FIGURE 1 | Energy primary, transformation, distribution, and end-uses in Spain for year 2011 (values as percentage). Adapted from Danesin et al. (2012).
Renewable energies are included in the conversion side.
generation sector is the best efficient one, mainly due to renewable
energy inputs.
At the autonomous region level, the Catalan energy system is
slightly different from the national one where it is embedded (Gen-
eralitat de Catalunya, 2012). Although Catalonia has also a high
dependence on fossil fuels (meaning more than 75% of primary
energy), it cannot rely on coal and it has much less renewable
energy. The structure of primary energy that entered the system in
2009 was vastly dominated by oil (47.1%), followed by gas (24.6%)
and nuclear energy (20.1%), this last source being 55% of the cur-
rent electricity energy mix, in contrast to nuclear Spanish share,
which is <20% (Figure 2). The structure of final energy in 2009 was
greatly dominated by oil (49.4%), followed by electricity (26.7%)
and natural gas (21.1%). This puts the Catalan economy in a deli-
cate situation regarding what might happen to global level in terms
of price and supply problems in oil, natural gas, and nuclear fuel.
Almost 45% of petroleum products are intended for final con-
sumption in the transportation sector, while 25% is allocated to
non-energy uses, like its use as raw material in the petrochemical
industry. Only 2% is used to generate electricity. As for natural gas,
it is becoming a key component in the Catalan energy system: half
of it is used to generate electricity, and the other half in the final
consumption in industry, homes, and services. The current con-
tribution of renewable energy is very small (<3% of total primary
energy). This low percentage of contribution is very much below
the Spanish average and the European Union, which is similar to
the Spanish one. Last but not least, emissions of greenhouse gases
in Catalonia have increased 60% since 1990, well above the Kyoto
protocol limits.
At the infrastructural level, two systems appear significant for
MOSES analysis: crude oil and oil products on one hand, and
natural gas on the other. These infrastructures are managed in
centralized form. The Spanish oil and storage network (Figure 3)
is managed by CLH Group1, one of the largest private companies
in its sector at an international level, which comprises Compañía
1www.clh.es
Logística de Hidrocarburos and its subsidiary CLH Aviación. It has
one of the largest oil product transportation and storage networks
in the world, with over 4,000 km of oil pipeline and a storage
capacity of 7.9 million cubic meters spread over 38 storage, 28 avi-
ation facilities, and 8 refineries. In Catalonia, CLH has four storage
facilities in Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and Tarragona (Figure 3B).
The Barcelona and Tarragona facilities also permit the discharge of
oil and oil products from tanker vessels. The oil pipeline network
in this community is over 343 km long and connects all the facil-
ities with one another, linking up with the rest of the oil pipeline
network in the province of Lleida, to the west. In addition, this
network has four oil pipeline and pumping facilities and is also
connected to the refinery that operates in Tarragona, where we
also find an important CLH dispatching center. CLH Aviación, for
its part, provides its aviation kerosene service into plane services
at Girona and Barcelona airports in this autonomous region.
The Spanish gas system (Figure 4) is technically managed
by ENAGAS2. It has nearly 10,000 km of pipelines throughout
the Spanish territory, three underground storage facilities located
in Serrablo (Huesca), Gaviota (Vizcaya), and Yela (Guadalajara),
and four regasification plants: Barcelona, Huelva, Cartagena, and
Gijón. It also owns 40% of the Bilbao regasification plant. ENA-
GAS terminals in Spain have 2,646,500 m3 of liquefied natural gas
storage capacity and an output capacity of 6,250,000 Nm3/h. In
Catalonia, ENAGAS has one regasification plant in Barcelona, and
two transmission and compression centers, in Tivissa and Bany-
eres, and one transmission center in Hostalric (Figure 4B). The
gas pipeline in this community has two branches and it is over
450 km long.
Among energy infrastructures, power transmission networks
stand as one of the most critical. Although power generation and
end-uses of energy analysis will be reflected in subsequent versions
of MOSES, transmission power network is presented here since we
assess its vulnerability in the next section and include it in the final
evaluation of energy security levels. Power transmission network
2www.enagas.es
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FIGURE 2 |The Catalan energy system in 2009. Values in terajoules. Adapted from Generalitat de Catalunya (2012).
FIGURE 3 | Oil energy network. (A) National Spanish network, with 38 storage facilities, 28 aviation facilities, 8 refineries, and 14 ports. (B) Catalan
subsystem, with 2 ports, 4 storage facilities, and 1 refinery (source: http://www.clh.es).
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FIGURE 4 | Gas energy network. (A) National Spanish network, with 4 regasification plants, 45 transmission and compression centers, and 3 underground
storage facilities. (B) Catalan subsystem, with one regasification plant and two compressor and transmission stations (source: http://www.enagas.es).
at the national level is managed by Red Eléctrica de España3. It
works currently as the sole Transmission System Operator (TSO)
of the Spanish electricity system. This transmission grid, consider-
ably larger and bulkier in terms of lines and substations than its oil
and gas counterparts, due to the energy-vector nature of electric-
ity, is composed of more than 41,200 km of high voltage electricity
lines and more than 5,000 substations, with some 78,000 MVA
of transformer capacity (Figure 5). At the Catalan level, power
transmission facilities include more than 9,000 km of high voltage
electricity lines and more than 1,000 substations, with some 6,300
MVA of transformer capacity (Figure 5B). It is worth mentioning
the strategic geographical situation of Catalonia, sharing borders
with France, with respect to the European electric connectivity
requirement among countries, which allows the accomplishment
of the 10% electricity exchange level required by the EU between
Spain and France (European Council, 2002).
RESULTS
Results are presented and analyzed following MOSES four-step
methodology in a comparative way. These have been summarized
in Table 1, where the evolution of energy security bands (“Secu-
rity”) at each step and for both regions, Spain (ES) and Catalonia
(CAT), are shown as a consequence of existing constraints (“Con-
straint”) at each step. Although some variability in indicators is
observed, depending on the primary energy analyzed, two funda-
mental external risk indicators common to crude oil, oil products,
and natural gas energy sources are net import dependence and polit-
ical stability of suppliers. From this perspective, and since low risk
from political stability of suppliers is strongly limited at the Euro-
pean level in general, and southern European regions in particular
(more or less well-distributed amongst Africa, the Middle East, and
3www.ree.es
countries of the former Soviet Union), Step 1 makes a first segrega-
tion of regions with the former indicator as the most important.
On the other hand, entry points (i.e., ports and pipelines) and
diversity of suppliers are considered the cardinal external resilience
factors and they are considered in Steps 2 and 3, respectively. Aver-
age storage levels, send-out capacity in the case of gas and other
factors, are considered to evaluate the domestic resilience factor
which, together with other complementary variables like volatility
of domestic conversion, energy intensity, or number of refineries,
helps MOSES to classify the regions with its final security level
in Step 4. Although IEA has not provided us with the final clas-
sification of energy security levels for Spain, the following points
review the evolution of the Spanish and Catalan security levels
through these aforementioned steps and using the best available
data known to the authors. The list includes one final and origi-
nal security assessment related with the resilience of the electricity
system in terms of complex networks.
• Crude oil : IEA countries have been segregated into three cat-
egories: low (≤15%), medium (40–65%), and high (≥80%)
import dependency. From this point of view, both, Spain and
Catalonia, stand in the last group, a fact that gives a “B–E” secu-
rity profile band. Spain has a high level of import infrastructures
and diversity of suppliers (Jewell, 2011), but its storage levels are
<50 days (IEA, 2011), which gives a final level security of C.
The Catalan subsystem gives a more worrying situation, with a
lower infrastructural capacity, similar diversity of suppliers but
a storage capacity, which is roughly 10% of the Spanish one
(4 storage facilities over 38, Figure 3). If we consider GDP as
a proxy for energy use of a region and the fact that Catalonia
shares approximately 18% of the Spanish GDP, this can gives
us a rough estimate of half the storage levels of Spain for the
Catalan region, and a final security level band of “C–D.”
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FIGURE 5 | Power transmission networks. (A) National Spanish network. (B) Catalan subsystem. Red and green colors show 400 and 220 kV electric lines,
respectively (source: http://www.ree.es).
• Oil products: Oil products consumed can either be refined
domestically or imported. MOSES segregates middle distillates
from motor gasoline and other oil products, and the assessment
process includes slightly more sophisticated substeps, which can-
not be reproduced at lower level regional scale due to lack of
available data.
• Natural gas: Assessing natural gas-related security levels follows
a similar procedure as that described above for crude oil. In
this case, IEA countries have been segregated into low (≤10%),
medium (30–40%), and high (≥70%) import dependency. From
this point of view, both regions stand in the last group, a fact
that gives a “B–E” security profile band. Spain has a high level
of import infrastructures and diversity of suppliers, and high
levels of send-out capacity (Jewell, 2011), which gives a final “B”
security level for the country. On the contrary, the Catalan sub-
system gives a more unfavorable situation, with an infrastruc-
tural capacity so diminished that cannot be counterbalanced by
other more favorable factors. Since its send-out capacity is not
available, Catalonia has a final “D–E” band of security levels.
• Coal : Security of coal supply is analyzed by considering total
coal flow and import dependency and proportion of under-
ground mining as external and domestic risks, respectively. Entry
points and diversity of suppliers are used as indicators of external
resilience. Spain imports 55% of its coal and 47% of its internal
conversion is from above-ground mining4, which gives an “A”
energy security level to the country. Catalonia imports 68% of
its coal (Figure 2) and although supplier diversity could be con-
sidered high, having only two sea ports as import infrastructures
imply a final security level band of “D–E.”
4http://www.lne.es/cuencas/2012/11/04/mitad-carbon-extraido-espana-procede-
minas-cielo-abierto/1321532.html
• Biomass, biofuels, and waste: As in the case of oil products, the
assessment process includes slightly more sophisticated substeps,
which cannot be reproduced at lower regional level due to lack
of available data.
• Nuclear power : MOSES assesses the likelihood of disruption in
the supply of electricity produced from nuclear power plants but
it does not assess the safety of nuclear power plants. This like-
lihood depends on domestic risks (i.e., unplanned outage rate
and average age of nuclear power plants) and domestic resilience
factors (i.e., diversity of reactor models and number of nuclear
power plants). With six nuclear power plants built essentially
in the 1980s5, Spain is in the low security level range, with an
unplanned outage rate between 3 and 6% (defined and reported
by the Atomic Energy Agency) and a number of power plants
between 4 and 10, which gives a final security level of “D.” For its
part, assuming the same level of outage rate, Catalonia has in its
region only three nuclear facilities, which gives a final security
level of “D–E” to the region.
• Renewables (geothermal, hydropower, solar, wind, and ocean
energy): These are primarily used to produce electricity, so the
security of their supply would be roughly related to the vul-
nerability of electricity system. Although MOSES provides a
quantitative evaluation of hydropower in particular in terms of
its conversion volatility, we cannot give an accurate estimation
of the Spanish nor the Catalan hydropower conversion volatility
due to lack of available data.
• Power network: Reliable penetration (and consequent high secu-
rity) of variable renewable and non-renewable power sources
depends on the flexibility of the whole electric system where
5http://www.csn.es/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
25&Itemid=18&lang=es
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they are embedded (Chandler, 2011). This flexibility depends
on technological, geographical, institutional, and market fac-
tors and its systematic assessment presents a remarkable level
of complexity. Rather, here we present a simplified assessment
process of the power network structural security based on com-
plex networks science (Newman, 2010). The method has been
shown useful in order to segregate European power transmission
networks into fragile and robust ones, revealing meaningful cor-
relations with real malfunction events (Solé et al., 2008). It can
be summarized as follows (details can be found in the Supple-
mentary Material of this article): (a) a probability distribution
of a specific topological variable (in this case the so-called degree,
defined as the number of cable lines connected to each substa-
tion) is chosen in order to characterize each network; (b) a theo-
retical prediction of the critical fraction of substations needed to
disconnect the network, based on random and selective removal
of substations, is combined with experimental evidence; and (c)
the deviation obtained from the theoretical prediction is used as
the final performance of the network in terms of the vulnerabil-
ity of the electricity system. In the case of Spain (Figure 5A),
positive deviations from theoretical prediction are less than
5.5%, whereas negative deviations for Catalonia reach 13.6%
thus signaling a less robust network for the latter (Figure 5B).
Since the Spanish network was originally classified in the fragile
group (Solé et al., 2008), we have given this network a “C” energy
security level and a final “D” security level for the Catalan one.
DISCUSSION
Energy security concepts have been historically shaped by sepa-
rate policy challenges and academic disciplines (Cherp and Jewell,
2011; Jewell and Cherp, 2013). The energy security conceptual
core is rooted on sovereignty and geopolitics, and it focuses on risks
arising from foreign control over crucial energy systems. In the last
several decades, two complementary perspectives have also been
considered in order to deal with the increasing meta-complexities
and uncertainties that characterize energy systems nowadays. On
the one hand, the “robustness” perspective, more connected with
computer analysis, modeling, and engineering of complex and
critical infrastructural systems. On the other, the “resilience” per-
spective, related with the economic analysis of energy markets
and with views of energy as a commodity rather than a public
good. Although MOSES seeks to integrate the three perspectives,
it predominantly focuses on sovereignty and robustness concerns.
It also excludes relevant medium- and long-term perspectives
on energy security, such as the environmental impact of energy
systems, rapidly growing demand for energy services, level and
volatility of energy prices, and the depletion of natural resources.
It deals exclusively with national indicators and does not handle
security of solar, wind, and ocean energy, which cannot be ana-
lyzed separately from security of electricity systems. That being
recalled, results shown in Table 1 highlight the vulnerabilities of
both the Spanish and Catalan energy systems, using MOSES as it is
currently defined. As we can see, final classification levels of energy
security for Catalonia are always equal or lower than those found
for Spain, suggesting a strong and significant energy hierarchy dis-
ruption between both regions. Among all primary energy sources,
natural gas and coal offer the most disparate levels of security
between both regions: B to D–E and A to D–E, for Spain and Cat-
alonia, respectively. On the contrary, security levels for crude oil,
nuclear, and the power network are much more similar and in the
lower range, suggesting similar security issues for both regions.
This generalized reduction of security levels for Catalonia comes
as an expected result, since MOSES does not consider normalized
indicators. In fact, if a region has only a single pipeline and only
imports from a single source, being exposed to high risk or hav-
ing a low-resilience capacity is not mitigated by having a small
energy system: in this case, whether a country is small or large is
irrelevant to its high external vulnerability. In this sense, and since
historically economies of scale have been the most important dri-
ver for energy infrastructures, these results could be generalized
to regions embedded in other regions: these will generally have
an equal or lower energy security level than its embedding region.
The validity of MOSES in the limit of the lowest spatial scale (e.g.,
the definition of a region such as a metropolitan area) remains
unclear and it obviously imposes a constraint on its applicability.
Divergence between security levels will depend also on how long
both regions have been historically coexisting and the centraliza-
tion level of energy-related decision processes. It is important to
recall that no single set of metrics is suitable for assessing energy
security for all purposes in all situations and that the identification
of energy security profiles must come from empirical groupings
and implicit judgments on what is an adequate level to consider
an indicator a signal of sufficiently high-risk or low-resilience to
influence the energy security risk profiles (Jewell and Cherp, 2013).
The security of an energy system is not limited to the state of
its infrastructure (the primary focus of MOSES), but also to the
effectiveness of its policies and regulations as well as the mar-
ket structure and the investment climate. In order to define a
more secure energy model at a regional level, and for Catalonia in
particular, generic responses based on human scale development,
which conciliate environmental, social, and economic demands,
must consider lower energy intensity, diversity of energy options,
and research and development of new energy carriers (Cherp and
Jewell, 2011). In order to minimize risk, specific responses play
an important role for the Catalan case study and for each of
the three perspectives mentioned above: sovereignty, robustness,
and resilience (Table 2). The most important one is the defini-
tion of a strong, durable, and secure legal framework (currently
non-existing neither in Spain nor in Catalonia), that at the same
time facilitates short, medium, and long term energy planning. A
more secure regional energy model should be based on the cur-
rent European legislative frame. This is: (1) the “Third Energy
Package” (European Parliament and Council, July 2009) on the
opening of internal gas and electricity markets, which highlights
the importance of separation of activities in energy markets to
prevent vertical integration leading to monopolistic practices, and
in total alignment with the objectives of the “European Strategy
2020”to achieve a secure, competitive, and sustainable energy sup-
ply system for the European Union; (2) the Directive 2004/8/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council (European Union,
2004) on the promotion of cogeneration based on the useful heat
demand, to promote small power installations; (3) the Directive
2009/28/EC (European Union, 2009) on the promotion of the use
of energy from renewable sources, which establishes the obligation
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Table 1 | Energy security levels for different primary energy sources in Spain (ES) and Catalonia (CAT), including power network infrastructure, a
security level not considered in MOSES procedure.
Primary
energy
Region Step 1: import
dependency
Step 2 :import
infrastructure
Step 3: diversity of
suppliers
Step 4: storage/send-out/other
Crude
oil
ES Constraint ≥80% ≥5 crude oil ports High <50 days storage
Security B–E B–C B–C C
CAT Constraint ≥80% 2 ports+1 pipe High <25 days storage
Security B–E C–D C–D C–D
Natural
gas
ES Constraint ≥70% ≥3 LNG ports/≥5 pipes High High send-out capacity
Security B–E B–C B–C B
CAT Constraint ≥70% 1 port LNG+2 pipes High Not Available
Security B–E D–E D–E D–E
Coal ES Constraint 30–60% ≥5 ports High ≤40% underground mining
Security A–B A–B A–B A
CAT Constraint ≥70% 2 ports High Not existing
Security C–E D–E D–E D–E
Nuclear ES Constraint – – Unplanned outage rate >3% Number and diversity of nuclear power plants
Security – – C–E D
CAT Constraint – – Unplanned outage rate >3% Number and diversity of nuclear power plants
Security – – C–E D–E
Power
network
ES Constraint – – – Error >5%
Security – – – C
CAT Constraint – – – Error >10%
Security – – – D
Table 2 | Perspectives on energy security and options to improve sovereignty, robustness, and resilience for the Catalan case study [adapted
from Figure 1 (Cherp and Jewell, 2011)].
Perspective Threats Risk minimization Specific responses
Sovereignty Sabotage and terrorist attacks; political;
embargoes; malevolent exercise of
market power
Protection of infrastructures;
political/economic control of energy
systems; trusted suppliers;
switching to domestic fuels
Medium and short-term energy planning; legal
security; biomass
Robustness Failures of energy infrastructure;
extreme natural events; demand on
outgrowing supply; resource depletion
Upgrading/renewal of
infrastructures; adoption of safer
technologies; switching to more
abundant resources
Smart-grid development; distributed and on site
power generation; renewable energy; energy
efficiency; biomass, wind and solar
Resilience Technology changes; variations of
climate; market; volatility; regulatory
changes
Adoption of new technologies;
climate change adaption and
mitigations policies
Medium and short-term energy planning; long
term energy planning; transparent pricing
system and electricity bill; legal security
to rationalize and to accelerate the administrative procedures to
authorize the distribution and transport network connections;
(4) the 2012/27/UE Directive (European Union, 2012) on energy
efficiency, which considers the contribution of distributed gener-
ation to reduce load off peak hours, the connection with sources
close to the place of use, and distributed storage as some of the
mechanisms important to improve the energy efficiency of the
electrical system. It also proposes economic schemes (as “dynamic
tariffs”) to encourage distributed generation as an effective way
of demand response; and (5) the legislative package on climate
and energy, specified within the 20–20–20 objectives (reduction
of CO2 emissions, the introduction of renewable energy, and
reducing consumption) and establishing a firm commitment to
a low carbon and green economy. Secondly, electricity distribu-
tion networks should act as the basic infrastructure that enables
the renewable penetration across the region. Information and
communication infrastructures, such as optical fiber, have to be
deployed along with power networks to reach equitable economic
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and social development and same opportunities among cities and
rural areas. Within this process, smart metering roll-out is one of
the short-term commitments that must be deployed as a basis of
the future power network. To do this optimally, some technical
issues (such as standards) and non-technical ones (such as busi-
ness models related to smart meters, open data, and privacy, among
others) need to be addressed. The confluence of telecommunica-
tions and power infrastructures (for instance with a public–private
partnership that plays as a neutral operators) should be explored to
adapt to the multi-utility approach for rural and semi-rural areas
and to avoid dominant positions in the market. Last but not least,
a thorough evaluation of the particularities of the Catalan renew-
able energy potential and its relation with the economic sphere
must be conducted, including the assessment of wind (more than
3000 MW potential in an environment compatible areas), pho-
tovoltaic (huge potential under net metering schemes and solar
farms), and concentrated solar power (Generalitat de Catalunya,
2012).
In the approximation presented here, four strong simplifica-
tions have been made regarding the complex networks approach
to power transmission grid reliability (Watts and Strogatz, 1998):
(1) all transmission lines are assumed to be bidirectional and
hence the resulting graph is undirected; (2) the nodes of the net-
work (i.e., generators, transformers, substations, and so on) are
treated as identical, featureless vertices; (3) all transmission lines
are assumed to be identical (that is, unweighted, with no attrib-
utes associated to edges) ignoring the important fact that voltages
vary and that different lines have significantly different carry-
ing capacities, impedances, and physical constraints; and (4) only
the transmission network is considered, thus ignoring an entire
(and much larger) associated network, responsible for distribut-
ing power from the grid to individual house, offices, factories, etc.
Despite these oversimplifications, this model has been shown to be
suitable for the analysis of the robustness of transmission networks
(Solé et al., 2008). Nonetheless, energy security in terms of power
grids at regional and local levels must also include distribution
networks in order to take into account some of their very particu-
lar features, like renewable energy injections and voltage stability.
In the authors’ view, the development and validation of such an
evolved model (to the author’s knowledge, non-existent yet) capa-
ble of translating these features in terms of security and reliability
of the power grid, would significantly complete and improve the
MOSES methodology.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents an application of the IEA MOSES to evaluate
security of supply of individual sources and fuels in Spain and
Catalonia. Results show an important difference in energy secu-
rity levels between these regions, suggesting a strong hierarchical
break between them at the energy systems level. Our results imply
a remarkable deficit in terms of energy security levels for Catalo-
nia if it was involved in a sovereignty scenario in the near term.
In order to define a more secure energy model at a regional level,
less risky and more resilient, the evolution toward a new energetic
paradigm should be enclosed in a strong and durable legal frame-
work, which promotes (a) the opening of internal energy markets
(which highlights the importance of separation of activities to
prevent vertical integration leading to monopolistic practices), (b)
the promotion of cogeneration based on useful heat demand (to
promote small power installations), (c) the promotion of renew-
able sources (which establishes the obligation to rationalize and to
accelerate the administrative procedures to authorize the distribu-
tion and transport network connections), and (d) energy efficiency
(which considers the contribution of distributed generation to
reduce load off peak hours, the connection with sources close to
the place of use, and distributed storage). Although the adoption
of policies aimed at deploying any of this aforementioned aspects
is fundamental in order to decrease external and domestic risks
and increase resilience in energy security, an overall framework
based on human scale development and quality of life is needed in
order to redefine human needs and how these needs can be finally
satisfied in terms of energy.
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